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Abstract
We explore whether a greater amount of environmental disclosure can reduce a
firm's ex ante cost of equity. This could occur because the quantity of environmental
information changes investors' risk perception of the company, thereby influencing
its ex ante cost of equity. Our study is a cross-country analysis of 1481 multinational
corporations (MNCs) across 43 countries and territories from 2013 to 2019. Firstly,
we measure investors' risk perception as a firm's ex ante cost of equity by employing
five different valuation models, all based on equity analysts' forecasted data. We then
investigate whether large quantities of environmental information disclosed by an
MNC affect its ex ante cost of equity. We find evidence that investors price the
amount of environmental disclosure. More environmental disclosure decreases a
firm's ex ante cost of equity because it lessens investors' information asymmetry.
However, this relationship is non-linear. Once the amount of environmental disclo-
sure data exceeds a certain threshold level, a firm's ex ante cost of equity will rise
again. Our empirical results also suggest that non-financial factors at the country
level play a role in shaping how investors perceive a firm's riskiness. Locating the firm
in a country with better environmental performance and a higher score of the human
development index can reduce investors' risk perception and result in a lower ex ante
cost of equity. A policy implication of our findings is that a global standardised and
effective corporate sustainability reporting is needed to provide investors a more
holistic view for evaluating the riskiness of their investments.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
According to a recent survey (BAML, 2020), around 43% of global
fund managers think that climate change is the factor among the envi-
ronmental, social and governance (ESG) factors most likely to out-
perform in the 12 months following the survey. Although firms around
the world are not always required by their local regulators to disclose
their human rights records or greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
(Stanny, 2013), large institutional investors (e.g. Japanese Government
Pension Fund and Norway's Sovereign Wealth Fund) are urged by
global protestors (e.g. led by the environmental activist Greta
Thunberg) to report their influence on the earth. International and
supranational authorities also promote the inclusion of environmental
factors in the capital allocation by investors (e.g., ECB, 2020;
ESAs, 2021; IMF, 2019; OECD, 2020). At the regional level, the
European authorities (ESMA, EBA and ECB) introduced measures to
improve the relevant environmental disclosure (ECB, 2020;
ESAs, 2021). In 2021, the German constitutional court declared the
German government's climate protection goal as insufficient, thereby
ruling in favour of young environmental activists who had brought the
case (Guardian, 2021). Based on the literature (Cui et al., 2019; Hong &
Kacperczyk, 2009), we can surmise that shared beliefs and values of
environmental protection are growing strongly across countries. Inves-
tors start urging firms to disclose environmental impact information
including GHG emissions to the relevant stakeholders. As a result, envi-
ronmental campaigns and policy interventions may reduce investors'
demand for certain types of companies such as oil- or coal-producing
firms, and social movements highlighting their poor sustainability level
could ultimately drive up these firms' cost of equity (OECD, 2020).
Firms who aim to maximise value will try to lower their cost of
equity as much as possible. Prior literature on a firm's relation
between corporate social responsibility (CSR)/or environmental issues
and its ex ante cost of equity is mostly constrained to single-country
studies (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2015;
Plumlee et al., 2015; Sharfman & Fernando, 2008). Very few studies
have examined the topic from an international perspective. The
exceptions are El Ghoul et al. (2018) who find a negative relationship
between environmental performance and ex ante cost of equity and
Breuer et al. (2018) who document that a firm with better perfor-
mance in social and governance issues can reduce its cost of equity
where investor protection is strong. We contribute to this strand of
the cost of equity literature by researching whether investors price
the quantity of environmental information disclosed by a firm. Our
other contribution is to address the lack of global analyses in the rele-
vant literature. We carry out a cross-country analysis of 1481 multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) across 43 countries and territories during
the period 2013–2019. The ex ante equity financing cost, which we
estimate for each of our sample firms, is an appropriate forward-
looking measurement that reflects how investors perceive a firm's
riskiness (Chen et al., 2009; El Ghoul et al., 2011, 2018; Hail &
Leuz, 2006). Using a firm's ex ante equity cost, we can examine
whether the quantity of environmental information that a firm opts to
disclose to the public can influence investors' risk perception. In the
process of estimating the ex ante cost of equity, we employ five valu-
ation approaches for each sample firm, collecting equity analysts' fore-
casted fundamental variables such as earnings per share. In this study,
we use averages of those valuation models to gauge the firms' ex ante
cost of equity in order to avoid distortions and measurement prob-
lems from any particular approach.
We also explore whether country factors play a role in determin-
ing how investors perceive a firm's riskiness after controlling for the
level of environmental disclosure. In particular, non-financial factors at
the country level have received less attention in the environmental lit-
erature. In the CSR literature, scholars (Breuer et al., 2018; Cai
et al., 2016; Lau et al., 2010) document that the ex ante cost of equity
is likely to vary across these MNCs due to the differences in the coun-
try institutional qualities, the firms' individual abilities to respond to
macroeconomic and financial market conditions, the qualities of cor-
porate governance at the firm level and other factors. In this study,
we choose to focus on MNCs. Many companies throughout the world
have become multinational not only in the scale of their global busi-
ness operations but also in internationalising their capital structure by
raising funds from more than one stock exchange (Stonehill & Dullum,
1982). We examine the latter type of MNCs, which have raised capital
from domestic as well as from foreign financial sources. These firms
are usually the largest firms in their home country in terms of market
capitalisation. How these firms manage their environmental disclosure
and cost of equity is likely to be the centre of public interest and thus
a benchmark for purely domestic firms and non-cross-listed firms.
In this study, we firstly demonstrate that there is a potentially
non-linear relationship between a firm's environmental disclosure and
its ex ante cost of equity. A firm can minimise its ex ante cost of
equity by choosing the optimal environmental disclosure level
because of a reduction of investors' information asymmetry. Indeed,
although most of the previous studies focus on the linear relationship
between a firm's environmental disclosure in CSR/or environmental
dimensions and its ex ante cost of equity, our empirical results suggest
that there is a non-linear relationship between these two factors. We
show that greater disclosure of environmental information initially
reduces a firm's ex ante cost of equity. However, its ex ante cost of
equity will increase once a certain threshold quantitative level of envi-
ronmental disclosure is exceeded. We estimate the turning point for a
firm's environmental disclosure score as 84.6 out of a maximum dis-
closure score of 100, while the mean (median) of the environmental
disclosure for all our sample firms is 33.3549 (34.8837). For the vast
majority of our sample firms, environmental disclosure benefits out-
weigh the costs. Our empirical evidence shows that a firm's environ-
mental quantitative disclosure is value relevant to the investors via
the mechanism of reducing market information asymmetry.
We also find that investors do not assess a firm's GHG intensity
in isolation, but rather in association with the quantity of this firm's
environmental information available to the public. Due to a decrease
in the investor information asymmetry, a firm can eventually bring
down the risk premium required by its shareholders and compensate
for poor past performance in GHG intensity by disclosing more envi-
ronmental information.
2 YU ET AL.
Finally, we enhance the understanding of how non-financial fac-
tors at the country level also play a role in determining how investors
perceive a firm's riskiness. Our empirical findings suggest that multina-
tional firms enjoy a lower ex ante cost of equity when their senior
management is located in a country with a better country environ-
mental performance or greater human development progress (human
development index [HDI]). We obtain similar empirical results if we
replace a country's human development progress (HDI) with the
extent to which a country's citizens have freedom of expression in
their beliefs. Although non-financial country factors have received lit-
tle attention in the environmental literature, we contribute to the
literature by providing empirical evidence for the importance of non-
financial country factors. Needless to say, examining the role of a
country's environmental performance in relation to firms' environmen-
tal disclosure policies is of interest to MNCs and policymakers.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
theoretical background by reviewing the prior literature and develop
three testable hypotheses. We describe the research design in
Section 3 and discuss the empirical results in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
We explore whether and how the amount of environmental informa-
tion disclosed by a firm can influence investors' perception of a firm's
riskiness and its required risk premium. Firstly, we propose to use the
ex ante equity cost as an appropriate measure of investors' forward-
looking perception of a firm's riskiness. We then investigate how the
amount of environmental data disclosed by this firm will influence
investors' perception of its risk. We also aim to address the lack of
global analyses in the relevant literature. Since this is a cross-country
study composed of MNCs, we examine whether the variation of non-
financial country-level factors can impact investors' perception of this
firm's riskiness. In this section, we develop our hypotheses based on
the key theoretical idea of investors' market information asymmetry.
We start with the definitions of our two key concepts.
2.1 | A firm's quantity of environmental disclosure
To contribute to the strand of the cost of equity literature, we focus
on whether investors price the quantity of environmental information
disclosed by a firm. Currently, there are no particular regulatory
guidelines or a global authority to supervise how companies release
their environmental data to stakeholders (Alvarez Jaramillo
et al., 2018; Friede, 2019; PRI, 2017) although supranational
policymakers are making efforts towards standardisation
(e.g. OECD, 2020). For each country, firms must rely on their local or
regional (such as the European Union [EU]) mandatory and voluntary
disclosure instruments in order to realise the environmental recom-
mendations provided by the United Nations, the Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board, Impact Reporting and Investment
Standards and the Global Reporting Initiative (Landrum &
Ohsowski, 2018; Yu et al., 2018). Due to the flexibility firms are
given in the current situation, firms can in practice decide the quan-
tity of environmental information they reveal to the public. This
enables us to examine how the quantity of environmental informa-
tion disclosed by a firm can change investors' risk perception and
influence the required risk premium. Following the prior literature
(Benlemlih et al., 2018; Siew et al., 2016; Tamimi &
Sebastianelli, 2017), we use the Bloomberg environmental disclosure
score, which measures the amount of environmental information a
firm reveals to its stakeholders. All environmental information is
counted. Note that this environmental disclosure score is indepen-
dent of whether the environmental information is negative or posi-
tive. A firm with a higher Bloomberg environmental disclosure score
simply means that this firm is more transparent in environmental
issues.
2.1.1 | A firm's ex ante cost of equity
Following the prior finance literature (Chen et al., 2009; El Ghoul
et al., 2011, 2018; Hail & Leuz, 2006), we adopt the ex ante cost of
equity as a measure of investors' perception of a firm's riskiness.
Scholars (Hail & Leuz, 2006; Pastor et al., 2008) suggest that the ex
ante cost of equity is an appropriate metric representing a firm's
expected risk premium because a firm's future earnings and its growth
potential are considered in the process of estimating a firm's ex ante
cost of equity. We provide more detailed information on how we use
five valuation models to estimate the ex ante cost of equity for our
sample firms in the research methodology section.
2.1.2 | The relationship between environmental
disclosure and cost of equity
In this section, we develop our three hypotheses based on the concept
of investors' information asymmetry. We study the relation between a
firm's amount of environmental information disclosure and its ex ante
equity cost via investors' perception of the company's risk. Based on
the stakeholder theory (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Freeman &McVea, 2001;
Sanches Garcia et al., 2017), scholars suggest that sustainable compa-
nies are aligned with all stakeholders' interests. Therefore, a sustainable
firm is motivated to achieve high levels of transparency in order to alle-
viate the information asymmetries between itself and all relevant stake-
holders (Cheng et al., 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Merton, 1987;
Verrecchia, 2001; Yu et al., 2018). This can also explain why a recently
emerging shared belief—stakeholders persuading firms to report their
influence on the planet—has pushed corporate environmental disclo-
sure into the mainstream. When a firm reveals more environmental
information, a reduction of information asymmetry can lower investors'
risk perception of a firm, resulting in a drop of the required risk premium
and thus a lower ex ante cost of equity.
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Prior literature shows that equity analysts or investors price the
amount of environmental or CSR information in their investment rec-
ommendations and decisions (Albarrak et al., 2018; Griffin
et al., 2017; Rjiba et al., 2021; Sharfman & Fernando, 2008). For
instance, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) suggest that US companies initiating
information disclosure in the CSR dimension enjoy a lower cost of
equity than non-initiating firms. Siew et al. (2016) also find that for
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, greater quantities
of disclosure in the ESG dimensions can significantly reduce informa-
tion asymmetry. To address the relation between a firm's environmen-
tal disclosure and its ex ante cost of equity, we illustrate how a firm's
amount of environmental disclosed information can change investors'
risk perception through the mechanism of investors' information
asymmetry. Based on market information theory, a firm that reveals
greater quantities of environmental data to the public can reduce the
information asymmetry between investors (i.e. shareholders as
the principals) and a firm's management (acting as the agent). Conse-
quently, a firm disclosing more environmental information is seen as
less risky by investors, and investors may request a lower risk pre-
mium for investing, resulting in a reduction in the cost of equity.
Another ripple effect is that this firm is likely to expand its investor
base because of a decrease in investors' perceived risk. A rise in
demand from its potential investors may result in a cheaper cost of
equity for the firm (Breuer et al., 2018; Bui et al., 2019; El Ghoul et al.,
2018; Kim et al., 2015; Merton, 1987). Conversely, firms recognised
by investors to be involved in environmental or CSR misconduct are
penalised by investors, thus requiring a higher risk premium to com-
pensate for a possible future financial loss from environmental fines.
The corresponding outcome for these firms will be a rise in their cost
of equity (Bui et al., 2019; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2018).
Yet, it remains an unresolved empirical question in the literature
whether this relationship between the ex ante cost of equity and non-
financial disclosure is linear or non-linear. Additionally, the prior litera-
ture concentrates mostly on single-country studies (Dhaliwal
et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2015; Plumlee
et al., 2015; Sharfman & Fernando, 2008). For instance, some scholars
(Albarrak et al., 2018; Matsumura et al., 2014) find a linear relation
between a firm's cost of equity and its adjusted disclosure level in
CSR and environmental issues. Furthermore, previous studies
(Attig et al., 2013; Cheng et al., 2014) document that capital
constraints can fall if a firm's transparency is enhanced. However,
some scholars (Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Borghesi et al., 2014;
Trumpp & Guenther, 2017) show that additional investment in
CSR/environmental issues may not be able to enhance shareholders'
value without a limit.
To contribute to the existing literature, we use an international
dataset to explore whether a firm's greater amount of environmental
disclosure can lower a firm's ex ante cost of equity without limit. We
propose that a firm increases its environmental disclosure level
towards a level where its ex ante cost of equity is minimised, but
beyond that point the ex ante cost of equity will start rising. We illus-
trate the trade-offs a firm could encounter by using a simple one-
period model. Refer to Equation 1. We assume that the firm chooses
the optimal environmental disclosure level to minimise its cost of
equity.
Influenceona firm0s exante cost of equity¼ αθXγ þωXτ ð1Þ
X represents a firm's environmental disclosure level. By assuming
θ,γ,ω,τ > 0, we can measure the influence on a firm's ex ante cost of
equity with the magnitudes of these four parameters. Consequently,
θ,γ,ω,τ affect the shape of Equation 1. θXγdenotes the benefit a firm
receives from disclosing its environmental data, which can lower its ex
ante cost of equity further. Oppositely, ωXτ captures the firm's disclo-
sure cost through investors' risk perception, which raises its ex ante
cost of equity. We also predict that the magnitudes of θ,γ,ω,τ are likely
to be influenced by the firm- and country-level factors such as differ-
ent levels of corruption, political rights, the human development pro-
gress at country level or the percentage of institutional investors at a
company level (Cai et al., 2016; Cooper et al., 2010; Marquis
et al., 2016; Yu et al., 2020). By using this simple one-period model,
we can demonstrate that there is a potentially non-linear relationship
between a firm's environmental disclosure and its cost of equity.
According to Equation 1, the influence from X, which represents a
firm's environmental disclosure level, will be linear only if γ = τ = 1.
The economic rationale for a non-linear relationship between
environmental disclosure and ex ante cost of equity is as follows. Due
to a reduction of the investors' information asymmetry, the required
risk premium initially decreases via a reduction in perceived environ-
mental risks. Consequently, a company is likely to expand its investor
base due to an increased demand from its potential investors. There-
fore, a reduced required risk premium from investors and an increase
in its investor base lead to a lower ex ante cost of equity. Meanwhile,
the more environmental data a firm discloses, the more scrutiny it will
receive from the relevant stakeholders. This may result in environ-
mental disclosure costs through investors' higher risk perception,
which at some level of disclosure could overwhelm the benefits of
transparency.
The discussion above leads to our Hypothesis 1. We hypothesise
that firms can minimise their ex ante cost of equity by selecting the
optimal disclosure level in environmental issues because of a reduc-
tion of shareholders' information asymmetry. If this is the case, the
disclosed environmental information becomes value relevant to
the shareholders (Albarrak et al., 2018; Dhaliwal et al., 2011;
Matsumura, 2014).
Hypothesis 1. Greater quantities of environmental dis-
closure can reduce a firm's ex ante cost of equity in the
subsequent year because it reduces shareholders' infor-
mation asymmetry. However, this is potentially not a
linear relationship.
Furthermore, we explore how a firm's amount of environmental
disclosure can change investors' risk perception through another
channel, a decrease of information asymmetry via the joint effect of
environmental disclosure with a higher GHG intensity1 in the previous
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year. We investigate whether large quantities of disclosed environ-
mental data can lower investors' perception of a firm's riskiness linked
with its prior year's GHG emissions. The rationale of Hypothesis 2 is
also built upon the theoretical idea of investor information asymme-
try. We predict this joint effect to lower a firm's ex ante cost of equity
since potential market information asymmetry is lessened. We assume
that firms which are recognised by investors to be involved in greater
GHG emissions and environmental misconduct will be penalised by
investors in the subsequent year. Investors perceive these firms as
riskier investments, thus requiring a higher risk premium to compen-
sate for a possible financial loss from future environmental fines. Con-
sequently, these firms will experience an increase in their ex ante cost
of equity (Bui et al., 2019; Dhaliwal et al., 2014; El Ghoul, 2018;
Gerged et al., 2021). Some scholars (Bui et al., 2019; Dhaliwal
et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2015) find supporting empirical evidence for
this argument. Furthermore, Gerged et al. (2021) document that UK
firms with greater GHG emission risk are more willing to disclose
environmental information to the public. Following the prior literature,
we argue that firms with greater GHG intensity which disclose greater
amount of environmental information to the public in the subsequent
year can reduce information asymmetry and lower their investors' risk
perception and their ex ante cost of equity.
This leads to Hypothesis 2, which provides insight into whether
large quantities of disclosed environmental data can change investors'
perception of a firm's riskiness linked with its prior year's GHG
emissions.
Hypothesis 2. We predict that a firm with a higher
GHG intensity will benefit from a reduced ex ante cost
of equity if environmental disclosure is greater in the
subsequent year because of a reduction of information
asymmetry.
2.1.3 | Do non-financial country factors matter in
shaping investors' perception of a firm's riskiness?
The literature (Breuer et al., 2018; Bui et al., 2019; Lau et al., 2010)
observes that the cost of equity varies substantially across countries.
Most environmental studies concentrate on the influence of economic
factors on the cost of equity at the country level. By contrast, some
studies suggest that non-financial country factors also play as impor-
tant a role as economic factors (such as GDP per capita) in corporate
social and environmental issues (Breuer et al., 2018; Cai et al., 2016;
Cheung et al., 2020; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). For instance, Yu
et al. (2020) document that a country's national well-being can effec-
tively alleviate firms' greenwashing conduct in non-financial disclo-
sures. Bui et al. (2019) document that companies locating in a country
with better institutional qualities have an incentive to enhance their
disclosure of carbon data to the public. To contribute to the environ-
mental literature, we examine whether investors price non-financial
country factors. In Hypotheses 3a and 3b, we focus on two non-
financial factors: ‘country environmental performance’ and ‘a
country's human development progress’, which may influence inves-
tors' risk perception. Our Hypotheses 3a and 3b are also grounded in
the idea of investors' market information asymmetry.
Country environmental performance
Scholars have found evidence showing that a firm's environmental
policies and its reputation in environmental issues can change
acquirers', institutional investors' and individual investors' risk percep-
tion (Bloomberg Intelligence, 2018; Boone & Uysal, 2018; Fernando
et al., 2017). In Hypothesis 3a, we explore whether a firm's domicile
country's environmental performance can influence the ex ante cost
of equity via changing investors' risk perception.
Following the relevant environmental/CSR literature (Boone &
Uysal, 2018; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Lev et al., 2010; Rodriguez
et al., 2006), the rationale for this relationship is based on the idea of
investors' information asymmetry. In recent years, information on
country environmental performance ranking has become freely and
easily accessible to investors and other stakeholders. Various organi-
sations publish annual online country rankings of environmental
issues, such as Germanwatch or the Yale Centre for
Environmental Law and Policy. A country that provides better policies
and schemes in the environmental and social dimensions can help
firms enhance employee welfare and achieve better performance in
environmental and social issues. Consequently, the potential reduc-
tion of pollution and legal and employees' medical costs implies
greater production efficiency and could provide a positive cash flow
impact in the future (Boone & Uysal, 2018; Bui et al., 2019; Dhaliwal
et al., 2011). With a better environmental business environment,
investors may perceive firms to be less likely to suffer from environ-
mental scandals in the short term, which can result in a lower per-
ceived riskiness. The discussion above leads to Hypothesis 3a.
Hypothesis 3a. We predict that investors perceive a
firm to be less risky, and therefore require a lower ex
ante cost of equity, when it is located in a country with
a better country environmental performance.
If this hypothesis holds, investors price country environmental
performance in their investment process.
Human development progress at country level
Some researchers find that social, ethnic and national well-being or
religious factors can shape the way individuals think, which affects
their financial decisions (Cui et al., 2019; Friede, 2019; Guiso
et al., 2008; Heinkel et al., 2001; Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009; Stulz &
Williamson, 2003). For instance, Bailey et al. (2008) suggest that more
affluent, experienced and sophisticated investors are more likely to
look beyond their home market in their investments. In a similar vein,
we examine how a country's human development progress may
potentially influence investors' risk perception of companies domiciled
in that country, which so far received little attention in the environ-
mental literature. We develop Hypothesis 3b based on the idea of
investors' information asymmetry. Following the prior literature (Cai
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et al., 2016; Yu et al., 2020), we quantify a country's human develop-
ment progress by adopting the HDI from the United Nations (UNDP,
2018), which measures a country's overall national well-being, not
economic progress alone. Each country in this index is evaluated in
the following three areas equally: (a) a decent standard of living, (b) a
healthy life and life expectancy and (c) knowledge and education
attainment.
The rationale for Hypothesis 3b is as follows. We suggest that
investors in a country with a better human development progress
have greater opportunities and better abilities to maximise the use of
all available public information (Albarrak et al., 2018; Bansal &
Kistruck, 2006; Cai et al., 2016; Kim & Youm, 2017; Lyon &
Montgomery, 2013). For example, Rjiba et al. (2021) document that
complicated textual annual reports inhibit investors' ability to under-
stand these reports, resulting in greater information risk and a higher
cost of equity financing. Kim and Youm (2017) study how US individ-
ual investors can potentially influence equity analysts' recommenda-
tions by engaging with firms' corporate Twitter accounts. We argue
that investors living in a country with an insufficient human develop-
ment progress face greater market information asymmetry than those
who live in a country with a greater human development progress.
Moreover, we also predict a broader investor base is likely to develop
for firms located in a country with better human development pro-
gress. Citizens in a country with higher human development progress
are more aware of firms' existence in their local stock exchanges, and
more people can participate in investment activities (Bailey
et al., 2008). As more citizens participate in this risk sharing, a broader
investor base can change other investors' risk perception, making
firms located in the country less risky ex ante (Breuer et al., 2018;
Merton, 1987). All these factors (such as local investors who have bet-
ter abilities and opportunities to maximise the use of all publicly avail-
able information) contribute to a lower ex ante cost of equity required
by investors. Our discussion leads to Hypothesis 3b. In this hypothe-
sis, we explore whether an MNC can reduce its ex ante cost of equity
by being headquartered in a country with greater country human
development progress.
Hypothesis 3b. An MNC may reduce its cost of equity
by being headquartered in a country with better country
human development progress, a higher score on the
human development index.
3 | RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 | Model, sample construction and data
In this section, we discuss our company sample construction, data and
theoretical model. Firstly, we estimate a firm's ex ante cost of equity,
as proxied for investors' risk perception, by employing five different
valuation models. All these valuation models are based on equity ana-
lysts' forecasted data. The prior literature shows that using a firm's ex
ante equity cost is an appropriate measure of investors' forward-
looking perception of the firm's riskiness (Chen et al., 2009; El Ghoul
et al., 2011, 2018).
Then, we investigate whether the quantity of environmental
information disclosed by an MNC affects its cost of equity. Our sam-
ple is comprised of multinational firms that are available in the follow-
ing three databases: Refinitiv Eikon, Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S and
Bloomberg. We collect and merge these three databases to establish
our own cross-country dataset. We start with all constituent compa-
nies of the MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI) and only select the
firms which have raised their funds from more than one stock
exchange as our sample firms. We end up with an unbalanced panel
cross-country dataset comprised of 1481 firms across 43 countries
and territories that encompasses 10,367 firm-year observations dur-
ing the sample period 2013–2019.
3.1.1 | Model
Investors' risk perception: Estimating the ex ante cost of equity
Following the recent finance literature, we adopt the ex ante cost of
equity as an appropriate proxy for investors' risk perception on an
MNC (Chen et al., 2009; El Ghoul et al., 2011, 2018; Hail &
Leuz, 2006). Since the ex ante cost of equity is a forward-looking esti-
mation method taking into account a firm's future earnings and its
growth potential, it is a better predictor of a firm's expected risk than
estimators based on the historical beta premium (Hail & Leuz, 2006;
Pastor et al., 2008). In a similar vein, scholars (Chen et al., 2009; El
Ghoul et al., 2018; Fama & French, 1997) suggest that ex post realised
returns are inadequate measurements for a firm's cost of equity.
Therefore, we calculate the ex ante cost of equity for each of our
sample firms based on equity analysts' forecasts of earnings per share
and other corporate data as well as share prices.
We estimate the ex ante cost of equity as the internal rate of
return from employing the five different valuation approaches devel-
oped by Claus and Thomas (2001) (as our Model 1), Ohlson and
Juettner-Nauroth (2005) (as our Model 2), Gebhardt et al. (2001)
(as our Model 3) and Easton (2004) (as our Model 4). The fifth model
uses the forward earnings/price ratio, a common estimator adopted
by investment professionals (Pinto, 2020). To estimate the ex ante
implied cost of equity for our sample firms, we collect equity ana-
lysts' forecasted information for each firm, including the values of
forecasted earnings per share from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S. We
display these five valuation models in Table 1. We also summarise
the detailed implementation processes for each model in
Appendix A.
Following previous studies (Chen et al., 2009; El Ghoul
et al., 2011, 2018), we take the average value of the ex ante cost of
equity derived from all these five models as our main dependent vari-
able, COEA . In this study, we also present two additional versions of a
firm's ex ante cost of equity: COEB and COEC. COEB represents the
average value of the first four models, which are developed by aca-
demics. COEC represents the value of Model 5, which is often used by
practitioners.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































YU ET AL. 7
By taking the average of these valuation models, we can avoid
distortions and measurement problems from any particular model and
ensure a robust gauge of a firm's ex ante cost of equity across the five
estimation methods. In this study, the average ex ante cost of equity
in our sample is 10.34%, and the median value is 9.16%.
Our main model
Our primary model investigates whether large quantities of environ-
mental disclosure can reduce a firm's ex ante cost of equity (COEi,t),
that is, if a greater amount of environmental disclosure (ENVDIS) can
change investors' risk perception of the company, thereby influencing
its ex ante cost of equity. We also examine whether investors price
the following two non-financial country factors into their investment
decisions, ‘country environmental performance’ and ‘a country's
human development progress (HDI)’, which may impact investors' risk
perception. These represent our key variables together with the envi-
ronmental disclosure (ENVDIS) that we detail below. To allow for a
potential non-linearity to occur between a firm's environmental dis-
closure and ex ante cost of equity, we add a quadratic term for envi-
ronmental disclosure to the major equation. The primary equation is
displayed below.
COEi,t ¼ αþβ1 ENVDISCt1ð Þþβ2  ENVDISCt1ð Þ2þβ3
 ENVDISCt1 GHG Intensityt2ð Þþβ4
 GHG Intensity or GHGScope1=EBITDAð Þ½ t1þβ5
 country environmental performancet1ð Þþβ6
















¼ αþβ1 ENVDISCt1ð Þþβ2  ENVDISCt1ð Þ2þβ3
 ENVDISCt1 GHG Intensityt2ð Þþβ4
 GHG Intensity or GHGScope1=EBITDAð Þ½ t1þβ5
 country environmental performancet1ð Þþβ6
 country0s human development progressð Þt1þ γ1 Betatþ γ2
Sigmatþ γ3 Market capitalisationt1þ γ4 Leveraget1þ γ5
RDt1þγ6 ROAt1þ γ7  Current ratioð Þt1þ γ8
 Sales growthð Þt1þ γ9 Disclosure growtht1þ γ10
 log Board sizet1ð Þþ γ11  Insidert1þ γ12  ENVDISCt1ð Þ
 Insidert1þ γ13  Institionalt1þ γ14  ENVDISCt1ð Þ
 country0s human development progress or Voiceð Þt1þ γ15
 log GDPð Þt1þ γ16  Political Stabilityð Þt1þ γ17
 Regulatory Qualityð Þt1þ γ18  Rule of Lawð Þt1þ γ19








Our dependent variable is COEi,t, a firm's ex ante cost of equity.
Our key independent variables are (a) a firm's quantity of environ-
mental disclosure (ENVDISC), (b) country environmental performance
and (c) human development progress at country level (HDI).
3.1.2 | Our three key independent variables
1. A firm's quantity of environmental disclosure (ENVDISC)
Using the Bloomberg environmental disclosure score, we study how a
firm's quantity of environmental disclosure (ENVDISC) influences its
ex ante cost of equity via investors' perception of environmental risk.
The environmental disclosure score obtained by Bloomberg repre-
sents the amount of environmental information a firm reveals to the
public through its annual reports, sustainability reports, websites and
other public sources. The prior literature has adopted the Bloomberg
disclosure scores representing a company's transparency in ESG
dimensions (Albarrak et al., 2018; Benlemlih et al., 2018; Siew
et al., 2016; Tamimi & Sebastianelli, 2017). The Bloomberg environ-
mental disclosure score simply measure the amount of environmental
information a firm discloses to the public and does not evaluate its
performance in the environmental dimension. The Bloomberg envi-
ronmental disclosure score ranges from 0.1 to a maximum score of
100. A higher score indicates greater transparency. For instance, the
highest value of 100 is for a firm that makes environmental informa-
tion available for every data point gathered by Bloomberg. Examples
of environmental metrics followed by Bloomberg are renewable
energy usage, direct GHG emissions, indirect GHG emissions, waste
disposal, water recycling, climate change policies and so on. We
observe an average environmental disclosure score of 33.35 across
our sample firms worldwide, while the median is 34.88 out of 100.
2. Country environmental performance
In this study, we adopt the country environmental performance index
created by Wendling et al. (2018) as the indicator measuring a coun-
try's environmental performance in various environmental dimensions
such as environmental policy, air quality, air pollution, climate, water
resources, and efficient energy. The measure is constructed such that
a country with a high score in the environmental performance index is
doing well in environmental issues. We define the domicile country as
a country where our sample firms' senior management locate.
3. A country's human development progress
Following the literature (Cai et al., 2016; Yu et al., 2020), we quantify
a country's human development progress by adopting the country-
specific HDI developed by the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP, 2018). The HDI from the United Nations measures a
country's overall national well-being, rather than economic progress
alone, such as GDP per capita. Each country in the HDI is evaluated in
the following three dimensions equally: (a) a decent standard of living,
(b) a healthy life and life expectancy and (c) knowledge and education
attainment.
3.1.3 | Our control factors in this study
We collect the relevant macroeconomic and governance data at the
country level from the World Bank and the IMF World Economic Out-
look database. We also collect firms' company information (e.g. the
country where a firm's senior management resides), other
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environmental data for each firm (e.g. GHG emissions) and fundamen-
tal financial information from Thomson ASSET4 and Bloomberg. We
discuss our key control variables below.
1. Our key control factors at firm level: BETA and SIGMA
In this study, we choose the sample firms from the MSCI ACWI and
only focus on those which list their equities on more than one stock
exchange. We quantify the sample firms' market risk using BETA and
SIGMA (Chang & Jo, 2019; Chen et al., 2009; Ng & Rezaee, 2015).
BETA represents how each of our sample firms responds to market
movements and can be a proxy of systematic (non-diversifiable) risk.
We estimate the beta value by regressing each sample firm's equity
return against the return of the MSCI ACWI (representing the market
portfolio) over 60 months. The value of SIGMA for each sample firm
is estimated as the annualised deviation of the daily equity return over
the last 260 trading days. We anticipate both control variables, BETA
and SIGMA, to be positively associated with a firm's cost of equity in
order to meet investors' expectations on the risk–return trade-off
relationship.
2. Our key control factors at the country level
We use the indicator of voice and accountability (World Bank, 2018)
as an alternative measure for a country's human development pro-
gress (HDI) index (UNDP, 2018). The indicator of voice and account-
ability gauges the extent to which a country's citizens have freedom
of expression in their beliefs.
Following the prior literature (Jandhyala, 2013; Siegel
et al., 2013), we also adopt similar control variables at the country
level, including the World Bank's worldwide governance indicators
(WGI) for representing the quality of a country's institutions. The six
time-varying governance indicators (WGI) created by the World Bank
are voice and accountability, government effectiveness, control of
corruption, political ability and absence of violence, the rule of law
and regulatory quality. In addition to controlling for the differences of
economic development across countries, scholars in the CSR and
finance literature often account for the influences of institutional
qualities (Breuer et al., 2018; Cai et al., 2016; Del Bosco &
Misani, 2016; Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Finney et al., 2011; Ioannou &
Serafeim, 2012; Tashman et al., 2019). For example, Bui et al. (2019)
document that companies that are more likely to reveal carbon infor-
mation to the public located in better governed countries. Poor insti-
tutional quality at the country level is more likely to result in weaker
institutional pressures on firms to achieve a satisfactory level of CSR
disclosure and performance (Cai et al., 2016; Campbell, 2007;
Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Marquis et al., 2016).
3.2 | A summary of all variables in our main model
In Table 2, we provide a detailed description and data sources of all
variables included in this study. Overall, we obtain and merge data
through multiple sources (e.g. Refinitiv Eikon, Thomson Reuters I/B/
E/S and Bloomberg). Some variables are obtained through our own
estimation (e.g. a firm's ex ante cost of equity).
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the key variables based on
our full sample of 10,367 firm-year observations from 1481 firms in
43 countries and territories from 2013 to 2019. The mean of the ex
ante cost of equity derived from the five valuation models is 0.1034,
while the average environmental disclosure score is 33.35 out of the
maximum score of 100.
Table 4 presents the correlations among the key variables. We
observe that all pairwise correlation coefficients among these key
control variables are less than 0.7, which eases our concern that
multicollinearity may influence our following regressions
(Bedeian, 2014). We can also see that the variable of Voice (World
Bank, 2018) is a good alternative indicator for a country's human
development progress (HDI) because of the relatively high correlation
coefficient between the two (0.7352).
4 | RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we empirically investigate how a firm's environmental
disclosure influences its ex ante cost of equity, via investors' percep-
tion of risk. We also examine whether non-financial country-level fac-
tors can influence investors' perception of a firm's riskiness.
We start with our full sample which is composed of 10,367 firm-
year observations from 1481 firms in 43 countries and territories from
2013 to 2019. As expected, with an international dataset covering
developed and developing nations, we observe a considerable varia-
tion across countries (Table 5).
Table 5 shows a breakdown by 43 countries and territories for
our two key variables: a country's average ex ante cost of equity and
the average level of its environmental disclosure scores. Not surpris-
ingly, the estimates of the ex ante cost of equity for firms domiciled in
the EU are pretty similar. For instance, the average value of the ex
ante cost of equity in France is 12.14%, Germany 12.64%, Nether-
lands 10.11%, Luxembourg 12.72% and Austria 12.93%. The average
values of the ex ante cost of equity are higher for the sample firms
domiciled in South Korea (21.12%) and Russia (19.04%). We note that
most of our sample firms in South Korea rely heavily on debt rather
than equity in their capital structure, and this high leverage might
increase investors' perception of risk.
Table 6 presents summary statistics by industry. Among our
10 GICS sectors, the three sectors with the highest ex ante cost of
equity are energy (11.82%), consumer discretionary (11.23%) and
materials (11.18%). At the same time, the three sectors which disclose
the greatest amounts of environmental information are materials
(40.78), utilities (38.55) and energy (36.15).
We also observe that some variables are highly industry depen-
dent as suggested by the literature. For example, scholars document
that a firm's environmental disclosure, a firm's corporate social perfor-
mance and a firm's financial indicators are highly industry dependent
(Bebchuk et al., 2009; Breuer et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2018; Lu
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TABLE 2 Definitions of variables and data source
Variable Description Data source
Key variables
Indicator of the ex ante Cost of Equity
COEA
We take the average value of the ex ante
cost of equity from the following five
valuation models: Model 1 (Claus &
Thomas, 2001), Model 2 (Ohlson &
Juettner-Nauroth, 2005), Model 3
(Gebhardt et al., 2001), Model 4
(Easton, 2004) and Model 5 (forward
earnings/price ratio) (Pinto, 2020). For
more detailed information on how we
estimate our sample firms' ex ante cost of
equity, please refer to Appendix A
Authors' calculation. We collect equity
analysts' forecasted information for each
firm including the values of forecasted
earnings per share from Thomson
Reuters I/B/E/S available in Eikon
Indicator of the ex ante Cost of Equity
COEB
We take the average value of the ex ante
cost of equity from the following four
valuation models: Model 1 (Claus &
Thomas, 2001), Model 2 (Ohlson &
Juettner-Nauroth, 2005), Model 3
(Gebhardt et al., 2001) and Model 4
(Easton, 2004). For more detailed
information on how we estimate our
sample firms' ex ante cost of equity,
please refer to Appendix A
Authors' calculation. Raw data from
Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S available in
Eikon
Indicator of the ex ante Cost of Equity
COEC
The ex ante cost of equity derived from
(Model 5) forward earnings/price ratio
(Pinto, 2020)
Authors' calculation. Raw data from
Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S available in
Eikon
ENVDISC: (Bloomberg environmental
disclosure score/100)*We use the
linear term and the quadratic term of
(ENVDISC) in this study.
The proprietary Bloomberg environmental
disclosure score quantifies the quantity of
environmental data a firm discloses to the
public. The minimum environmental score
ranges from 0.1 to the maximum score of
100 for those firms that reveal all data
points gathered by Bloomberg. In this
study, we include the linear term and the
quadratic term of this variable to allow
for a possible non-linearity in our major
equation
Bloomberg
GHG Intensity The greenhouse gas intensity is calculated
as the ratio of a firm's total greenhouse
gas emissions divided by its sales
revenue. We convert sales to a common
currency, the US dollar, in order to






We use GHG Scope1EBITDA
 
as the alternate
indicator of GHG Intensity. GHG Scope 1
emissions are defined as the direct
greenhouse gas emissions from sources
possessed or managed by the firm.
EDITDA is estimated as a firm's earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortisation
Authors' calculation. Raw data from
Bloomberg
A country's human development progress
(HDI)
In this study, we use HDI representing a
country's human development progress in
order to capture overall national well-
being. This index is a summary measure
of achievements in the following three
aspects: being knowledgeable, a healthy
and long life and the quality of living
standards
United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
Variable Description Data source
A country's environmental performance In this study, we measure a country's
environmental performance by adopting
the country environmental performance
index from Yale Centre for Environmental
Law and Policy. The country
environmental performance index
(Wendling et al., 2018) is composed of 24
environmental performance indicators
covering the following 10 dimensions: air
pollution, air quality, water and sanitation,
water resources, fisheries, climate and
energy, heavy metals, biodiversity and
habitat, forests and agriculture. Since this
index is updated every other year, we
adopt the data published in 2012, 2014,
2016 and 2018 for this study
Yale Centre for Environmental Law and
Policy (YCELP)
Voice and accountability In this study, we use this indicator as an
alternative measurement for a country's
human development progress. The
indicator of voice and accountability
measures perceptions of the extent to
which a country's citizens have freedom
of expression in their beliefs and are also
given rights in electing their government
World Bank
Control factors at firm level
Beta BETA measures how each of our sample
firms share price responds to market risk.
In this study, we estimate the beta value
by regressing each sample firm's equity
return against the return of the MSCI
World All Country Index (representing as
a market portfolio) over 60 months
Authors' calculation. Raw data from
Bloomberg
SIGMA The value of SIGMA for each sample firm is
calculated as the annualised standard
deviation of daily equity return over the
last 260 trading days
Authors' calculation. Raw data from
Bloomberg
Market capitalisation A firm's market value Bloomberg
Leverage A ratio of total debt to total assets Bloomberg
Return on asset (ROA) A ratio of net income to total assets Bloomberg
R&D A proportion of research and development
expenses to net sales
Bloomberg
Institutional ownership A proportion of shares held by institutional
investors
Bloomberg
Insider ownership A proportion of shares held by insiders Bloomberg
Sales growth rate A ratio of changes in sales from the prior
year
Control factors at country level
Log (GDP per capita) measured based on
PPP
Log (GDP per capita) is converted to the US
dollar at purchasing power parity
exchange rates
International Monetary Fund's World
Economic Outlook Database
Institutional qualities Political stability and absence of violence:
This indicator measures perceptions of
the possibility of political uncertainty or
politically driven violence
World Bank
Government effectiveness: This indicator
quantifies the quality of a country's civil/
public service and the trustworthiness of
World Bank
(Continues)
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et al., 2017; Miralles-Quiros et al., 2019). Therefore, we use sector
dummies to control for industry heterogeneity by adopting the Global
Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Following the prior interna-
tional empirical studies, we control industries/year fixed effects and
employ control variables at country level (Breuer et al., 2018; Cheng
et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2018; Lu et al., 2017). To solve the hetero-
skedasticity and autocorrelation problems, we analyse our panel
dataset using Panel EGLS cross-section weight with the White diago-
nal as our coefficient covariance method.
4.1 | Hypothesis 1: Empirical results
We find supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1. Our empirical results
show that there is a non-linear relationship between a firm's
environmental quantitative disclosure and its ex ante cost of equity.
According to all models presented in Table 7, which uses the ex ante
cost of equity COEA as the dependent variable, we can see that the
coefficients for the linear term and the quadratic term of a firm's envi-
ronmental disclosure are statistically significant at 1% to the ex ante cost
of equity. Our results suggest that a firm's greater environmental disclo-
sure can initially decrease the ex ante cost of equity but then raises it
once a certain threshold level of environmental disclosure is exceeded.
For robustness checks, we adopt two further measurements of a
firm's ex ante cost of equity to replace the ex ante cost of equity
COEA: They are the ex ante cost of equity COEB and the ex ante cost
of equity COEC.
2 The results shown in Table 8 are consistent with the
previous results in Table 7 and confirm that a non-linear relationship
exists between a firm's environmental disclosure and its ex ante cost
of equity.
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Variable Description Data source
a government's commitment to its
policies
Regulatory quality: This indicator measures
perceptions of a government to execute
sensible policies that stimulate private
sector development
World Bank
The rule of law: This indicator measures
perceptions of the extent to which agents
have trust and accept the rules of society
World Bank
Control of corruption: The indicator of
voice and accountability measures
perceptions of the extent to which a
country's citizens have freedom of
expression in their beliefs and are also
given rights in electing their government
World Bank
Note: This table shows the definitions and data sources of all our variables in this study.
TABLE 3 Summary statistics of key variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Median Max
The ex ante Cost of Equity COEA 0.1034 0.0600 0 0.0916 0.7911
The ex ante Cost of Equity COEB 0.1169 0.0730 6.25E-05 0.1012 0.9833
The ex ante Cost of Equity COEC 0.0640 0.0411 0 0.0561 0.9789
(Environmental disclosure/100) 0.3335 0.1785 0.0138 0.3488 0.9302
(GHG intensity/100) 4.4550 16.1810 0 0.5614 495.8765
(GHG Scope 1/EBITDA) 2.1756 9.6431 9.08E-07 0.1083 301.8090
(A country's environmental performance/100) 0.6958 0.1235 0.3057 0.6993 0.9068
A country's human development progress (HDI) 0.8841 0.0700 0.6000 0.9150 0.9540
(Voice/100) 0.7623 0.2260 0.0469 0.8227 1
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics of 10,367 firm-year observations from 1481 firms in 43 countries and territories from 2013 to 2019. We
estimate the ex ante equity financing cost for our sample firms. For the indicator of the ex ante Cost of Equity COEA, we take the average value of the
implied cost of equity from the following five valuation models: Model 1 (Claus & Thomas, 2001), Model 2 (Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth, 2005), Model 3
(Gebhardt et al., 2001), Model 4 (Easton, 2004) and Model 5 (forward earnings/price ratio) (Pinto, 2020). For the indicator of the ex ante Cost of Equity
COEB, we take the average value of the implied cost of equity from the following four valuation models: Model 1 (Claus & Thomas, 2001), Model 2 (Ohlson
& Juettner-Nauroth, 2005), Model 3 (Gebhardt et al., 2001) and Model 4 (Easton, 2004). For the indicator of the ex ante Cost of Equity COEC, the implied
cost of equity derived from (Model 5) forward earnings/price ratio (Pinto, 2020). For more detailed information on how we estimate our sample firms'
implied cost of equity, please refer to Appendix A.
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TABLE 5 Sample breakdown by 43 countries and territories
Country Firm number Mean of the ex ante cost of equity COEA Mean of environmental disclosure
New Zealand 5 0.0594 16.5822
Netherlands 10 0.1011 44.5664
Mexico 12 0.0834 38.1869
Malaysia 3 0.0602 19.9397
Luxembourg 4 0.1272 20.1878
Jordan 1 0.0764 22.0376
Japan 207 0.0797 40.6322
Italy 10 0.0895 51.1626
Israel 4 0.1075 19.8644
Ireland 5 0.1091 24.1037
Indonesia 21 0.0775 17.0773
India 3 0.0804 31.4565
Hungary 2 0.1002 43.3930
Hong Kong 62 0.0969 26.8430
Germany 48 0.1264 41.9683
France 53 0.1214 44.2686
Finland 11 0.0856 52.6388
Denmark 15 0.1235 33.7223
Colombia 3 0.0884 49.5425
Chile 6 0.0934 40.0014
China 80 0.1018 22.0915
Canada 50 0.1397 27.6721
Britain 63 0.1037 31.6507
Brazil 37 0.1179 44.2705
Belgium 7 0.1109 37.0827
Austria 3 0.1293 39.6990
Australia 43 0.0793 31.1060
Portugal 3 0.0753 54.9649
Portland 11 0.1384 27.9788
Philippines 15 0.0782 23.3786
Peru 1 0.0930 7.5305
Norway 8 0.0904 41.5004
Unites States 508 0.1087 28.0945
Turkey 13 0.1192 34.9136
Thailand 23 0.0809 39.2372
Taiwan 6 0.0745 58.9976
Switzerland 25 0.1420 42.2973
Sweden 21 0.0937 39.2048
Spain 14 0.0920 51.3201
South Korea 6 0.2112 32.2727
South Africa 32 0.1087 32.3233
Singapore 18 0.0812 26.8252
Russia 9 0.1904 30.4556
Full sample 1481 0.1034 33.3549
Notes: This table presents the country distributions for the observations comprising our sample between 2013 and 2019. Our international dataset is
composed of 10,367 firm-year observations from 1481 firms in 43 countries and territories. We estimate the ex ante equity financing cost for our sample
firms. For each country, the average estimation of the ex ante cost of equity of all sample firms in that country represents the country's ex ante cost of
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Furthermore, we visualise this relation between a firm's quantitative
environmental disclosure and its ex ante cost of equity through Figure 1
by using the regression results of Model 3 presented in Table 7.
In Figure 1, we estimate the turning point for a firm's environ-
mental disclosure score as 84.6 out of a maximum score of 100. At
the turning point, a firm's corresponding ex ante cost of equity is
6.44%. Figure 1 clearly shows that most of our sample firms can keep
on moving towards the minimum ex ante cost of equity (the turning
point) by revealing greater quantities of environmental information to
the public. In this study, the mean (median) of the environmental dis-
closure score for all our sample firms is 33.3549 (34.8837). Most of
our sample firms' environmental disclosure benefits outweigh their
environmental disclosure costs.
In Figure 2, we visualise how our sample countries distribute
around this U-shaped curve using the same regression results of
Model 3 in Table 7. Since the mean of the environmental disclosure
by countries ranges from 10 to 60 (out of the maximum score of 100),
all our sample countries are actually located on the left-hand side of
the turning point. This may explain why most of the previous studies
in CSR/environmental literature obtain a negative linear relationship
(Breuer et al., 2018; Bui et al., 2019; Matsumura et al., 2014), although
our empirical results show that the ex ante cost of equity will then
increase once the environmental disclosure score exceeds 84.6.
Our results support Hypothesis 1. Similar to the CSR literature's
findings that more investment in CSR cannot enhance shareholders'
value without a limit (Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Borghesi et al., 2014;
Trumpp & Guenther, 2017), we find empirical evidence for a non-
linear (quadratic) relationship between an MNC's environmental
quantitative disclosure and its ex ante cost of equity. Our empirical
evidence supports the rationale for this non-linear relation mentioned
in the previous section. Initially, a lessening of the investors' informa-
tion asymmetry lowers the required risk premium via a reduction in
perceived environmental risks, that is, the transparency gain far out-
weighs the costs of disclosure. Once the environmental data disclosed
exceed a certain threshold, the marginal benefits obtained from
greater transparency may fall below the marginal costs arising
from closer scrutiny by investors.
Finally, our empirical evidence for Hypothesis 1 also shows that a
firm's environmental quantitative disclosure is value relevant to the
investors, supporting a similar view in the prior literature (Albarrak
et al., 2018; Dhaliwal et al., 2011).
4.2 | Hypothesis 2: Empirical results
In Hypothesis 2, we investigate whether an MNC can benefit from
a reduced ex ante cost of equity if it moderates high GHG
intensity by increasing environmental disclosure in the subsequent
year. We examine this joint effect by using the interaction term
of a firm's environmental disclosure and its GHG intensity,
equity. For the indicator of ex ante Cost of Equity COEA, we take the average value of the ex ante cost of equity from the following five valuation models:
Model 1 (Claus & Thomas, 2001), Model 2 (Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth, 2005), Model 3 (Gebhardt et al., 2001), Model 4 (Easton, 2004) and Model 5
(forward earnings/price ratio) (Pinto, 2020). The proprietary Bloomberg environmental disclosure score quantifies the quantity of environmental data a
firm discloses to the public. The minimum environmental score ranges from 0.1 to the maximum score of 100 for those firms that reveal all data points
gathered by Bloomberg.
TABLE 6 Summary statistics by industry
Sector Firm number
The ex ante Cost of Equity COEA Environmental disclosure
Mean Median Mean Median
Consumer discretionary 267 0.1123 (0.0696) 0.0972 29.5351 (17.6804) 28.6822
Consumer staples 146 0.0976 (0.0596) 0.0866 34.6701 (16.8497) 37.2093
Energy 111 0.1182 (0.0499) 0.1109 36.1561 (19.9656) 37.2093
Healthcare 134 0.0918 (0.0582) 0.0818 30.6849 (18.3278) 31.7829
Industrials 271 0.1015 (0.0559) 0.091 32.7726 (16.5694) 33.3333
Information technology 159 0.0981 (0.062) 0.0866 31.9499 (19.7649) 33.3333
Materials 139 0.1118 (0.0608) 0.1007 40.7838 (17.1790) 43.4109
Real estate 95 0.0906 (0.0588) 0.0753 27.9463 (15.4655) 31.0078
Telecommunication services 61 0.1003 (0.0579) 0.089 32.9937 (14.5289) 34.8837
Utilities 98 0.1043 (0.0430) 0.0958 38.5535 (16.4904) 41.0853
Full sample 1481 0.1034 (0.0600) 0.0916 33.3549 (17.8465) 34.8837
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Our dataset is composed of 10,367 firm-year observations from 1481 firms in 43 countries and
territories. In this study, we cluster our sample firms into 10 GICS sectors. We leave out financial services companies since financial and banking
regulations may influence a firm's disclosure policy. We estimate the ex ante equity financing cost for our sample firms. For the indicator of the ex ante
Cost of Equity COEA, we take the average value of the ex ante cost of equity from the following five valuation models: Model 1 (Claus & Thomas, 2001),
Model 2 (Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth, 2005), Model 3 (Gebhardt et al., 2001), Model 4 (Easton, 2004) and Model 5 (forward earnings/price ratio)
(Pinto, 2020). The proprietary Bloomberg environmental disclosure score quantifies the quantity of environmental data a firm discloses to the public. The
minimum environmental score ranges from 0.1 to the maximum score of 100 for those firms that reveal all data points gathered by Bloomberg.
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TABLE 7 Regression results for all sample firms, the ex ante Cost of Equity COEA, 2013–2019
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
The ex ante Cost of
Equity COEA
The ex ante Cost of
Equity COEA
The ex ante Cost of
Equity COEA
The ex ante Cost of
Equity COEA













































































































the growth rate of ROA; t-1 0.0020
(1.1680)
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(ENVDISCt  1 * GHGt  2).
3 For detailed information on our variables'
estimation methods and their definitions, please refer to Table 2.
Based on Tables 7 and 8, most of our models show that there is a
consistent and negative association between a firm's ex ante cost of
equity and this joint effect. The statistical significance levels of this
joint effect range between 1% and 10%. The joint effect can be inter-
preted as the moderation impact of a firm disclosing large quantities of
environmental information retrospectively, thereby decreasing the risk
premium required by potential investors, even if it had high green-
house intensity in the previous year. Investors are willing to reduce
their required risk premium because their information asymmetry is
reduced by receiving increased environmental disclosure from the firm.
In addition to examining this joint effect, we also investigate the
direct effect of a firm's GHG intensity on its ex ante cost of equity.
Our empirical results in Tables 7 and 8 show that a firm's GHG inten-
sity, which is measured either by using the variable of GHGt  2 or the
alternative variable (GHG Scope 1t  1/EBITDAt  1) has no significant
effect on the ex ante cost of equity. Our empirical evidence on the
direct effect, which is in line with the previous studies (Li et al., 2014),
implies that a firm with a higher GHG intensity is not generally pen-
alised by investors. Our findings on the variable GHG intensity sug-
gest that investors do not view a firm's GHG intensity in isolation, but
rather in association with its disclosed environmental information
available to the public.
4.3 | Hypothesis 3a: Empirical results
In Hypothesis 3a, we examine whether an MNC's domicile country
environmental performance can impact its ex ante cost of equity via
changing investors' risk perception. We define the domicile country as
the country where a firm's senior management resides. Tables 7 and 8
show supporting evidence for Hypothesis 3a across all our models.
The coefficients of the country environmental performance are con-
sistently negative and significant at 1%–5% levels. Our regression
results suggest that investors perceive a firm domiciled in a country
with a better country environmental performance to be less risky. The
empirical findings support our rationale for Hypothesis 3a. A country
with a better country environmental performance can be considered
as a better environmental business environment. It provides better
environmental policies and schemes to help companies achieve
better environmental performance. Due to the potential reduction of
pollution, legal costs and environmental fines in the future, a greater
production efficiency or a positive cash flow impact can be predicted.
TABLE 7 (Continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4























































Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,367 10,367 10,367 10,367
Adjusted R2 0.6165 0.4903 0.4208 0.4844
Notes: COEi,t = α+β1(ENVDISCt  1)+β2 * (ENVDISCt  1)
2+β3 * (ENVDISCt  1 * GHG Intensityt  2)+β4 * [GHG Intensity or (GHG Scope1/EBITDA)]t  1+β5 *






ωkYeark+εit. We estimate the ex ante equity financing cost for
our sample firms. For the indicator of the ex ante Cost of Equity COEA, we take the average value of the ex ante cost of equity from the following five
valuation models: Model 1 (Claus & Thomas, 2001), Model 2 (Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth, 2005), Model 3 (Gebhardt et al., 2001), Model 4 (Easton, 2004)
and Model 5 (forward earnings/price ratio) (Pinto, 2020). For more detailed information on how we estimate our sample firms' ex ante cost of equity,
please refer to Appendix A. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Our dataset is composed of 10,367 firm-year observations from 1481 firms in
43 countries and territories from 2013 to 2019. We analyse our panel dataset by Panel EGLS cross-sectional weight with the white diagonal as our
coefficient covariance method.
*Significance at 10% level.
**Significance at 5% level.
***Significance at 1% level.
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Consequently, investors require less risk premium and therefore lower
the cost of equity. Our empirical results also indicate that investors price
a country's environmental performance in their investment process.
Moreover, our results for Hypothesis 3 are meaningful in eco-
nomic terms. By using Model 3 in Table 7, we find that, all else equal,
a one standard deviation increase in a domicile country's environmen-
tal performance can reduce a firm's ex ante cost of equity by 0.0031.4
Since the mean of the ex ante cost of equity for our sample firms is
10.34%, this corresponds to about a 3.05% decrease5 in the ex ante
cost of equity, which is an economically significant effect.
F IGURE 1 Multinational corporations’ environmental disclosure and cost of equity for all firms.
Source: authors' own elaboration. Our dataset is comprised of 10,367 firm-year observations from 1481 firms in 43 countries and territories from
2013 to 2019. The 43 dots represent the average cost of equity and average environment score for all companies by country/territory. We use
the regression results from Model 3 presented in Table 7. The minimum environmental score ranges from 0.1 to the maximum score of 100 for
those firms that reveal all data points gathered by Bloomberg. For the Indicator of Cost of Equity COE A, we take the average value of the implied
cost of equity from the following five valuation models: (Model 1) Claus and Thomas (2001), (Model 2) Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005),
(Model 3) Gebhardt et al. (2001), (Model 4) Easton (2004), and (Model 5) forward earnings price ratio (Pinto, 2020) [Colour figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE 2 A breakdown by 43 countries and territories.
Source: authors' own elaboration. Our dataset is comprised of 10367 firm-year observations from 1481 firms in 43 countries and territories from
2013 to 2019. The 43 dots represent the average cost of equity and average environment score for all companies by country/territory. We use
the regression results from Model (3) presented in Table 7. The minimum environmental score ranges from 0.1 to the maximum score of 100 for
those firms that reveal all data points gathered by Bloomberg. For the Indicator of Cost of Equity COE A, we take the average value of the implied
cost of equity from the following five valuation models: (Model 1) Claus and Thomas (2001), (Model 2) Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005),
(Model 3) Gebhardt et al. (2001), (Model 4) Easton (2004), and (Model 5) forward earnings price ratio (Pinto, 2020) [Colour figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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TABLE 9 Regression results for all sample firms, 2013–2019 (Voice as the alternative indicator of HDI)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
The ex ante Cost
of Equity COEA
The ex ante Cost
of Equity COEB
The ex ante Cost
of Equity COEC
The ex ante Cost
of Equity COEC
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4.4 | Hypothesis 3b: Empirical results
In the prior literature, scholars document that social, ethnic and
national well-being or religious factors can influence individuals'
financial decisions (Cui et al., 2019; Friede, 2019; Guiso et al., 2008;
Heinkel et al., 2001; Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009; Stulz &
Williamson, 2003; Yu et al., 2020). Based on the similar idea, we
investigate how a country's human development progress may poten-
tially influence firm's ex ante cost of equity through shaping investors'
risk perception. In Hypothesis 3b, we use the HDI to represent a
country's human development progress and overall national well-
being (refer to Table 2 for the detailed definition).
Tables 7 and 8 present supporting evidence for Hypothesis 3b,
which posits that an MNC headquartered in a country with better
country human development progress can have a lower ex ante
cost of equity. We observe that the coefficients of the country
human development progress are consistently negative and signifi-
cant at 1%–5% levels. Our findings support the argument that
investors in a country with better human development progress
have better abilities and/or opportunities to maximise the use of
all available information in assessing a firm's future prospects in
terms of riskiness. On the other hand, our results also imply that
investors living in a country with an insufficient human develop-
ment progress face a greater market information asymmetry than
those who live in a country with a greater human development
progress.
We include the interaction term (ENVDISCt  1 * a country’s
human development progresst  1) as one of our control variables. By
doing so, we examine how a country's human development progress
can influence the relation between companies' environmental
disclosure and cost of equity through the interaction of environmen-
tal disclosure and a country's human development state,
(ENVDISCt  1 * a country’s human development progresst  1).
According to the models presented in Tables 7 and 8, the coefficients
of this interaction term (ENVDISCt  1 * a country’s human development
progresst  1) are consistently positive at 1% significant level. Our
empirical results suggest that a firm disclosing more environmental
information will increase its ex ante cost of equity because of greater
scrutiny when headquartered in a country where citizens have better
abilities or greater power to express their beliefs.
TABLE 9 (Continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
The ex ante Cost
of Equity COEA
The ex ante Cost
of Equity COEB
The ex ante Cost
of Equity COEC
The ex ante Cost
of Equity COEC






















































Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,367 10,367 10,367 10,367
Adjusted R2 0.4296 0.4269 0.6724 0.5220
Notes: COEi,t = α+β1(ENVDISCt  1)+β2 * (ENVDISCt  1)
2+β3 * (ENVDISCt  1 * GHG Intensityt  2)+β4 * [GHG Intensity or (GHG Scope1/EBITDA)]t  1+β5 *






ωkYeark+εit. We estimate the ex ante equity financing cost
for our sample firms. For the indicator of the ex ante Cost of Equity COEA, we take the average value of the ex ante cost of equity from the following five
valuation models: Model 1 (Claus & Thomas, 2001), Model 2 (Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth, 2005), Model 3 (Gebhardt et al., 2001), Model 4 (Easton, 2004)
and Model 5 (forward earnings/price ratio) (Pinto, 2020). For the indicator of the ex ante Cost of Equity COEB, we take the average value of the ex ante
cost of equity from the following four valuation models: Model 1 (Claus & Thomas, 2001), Model 2 (Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth, 2005), Model 3 (Gebhardt
et al., 2001) and Model 4 (Easton, 2004). For the indicator of the ex ante Cost of Equity COEC, the ex ante cost of equity derived from (Model 5) forward
earnings/price ratio (Pinto, 2020). For more detailed information on how we estimate our sample firms' ex ante cost of equity, please refer to Appendix A.
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Our dataset is composed of 10,367 firm-year observations from 1481 firms in 43 countries and territories
from 2013 to 2019. We analyse our panel dataset by Panel EGLS cross-sectional weight with the white diagonal as our coefficient covariance method.
*Significance at 10% level.
**Significance at 5% level.
***Significance at 1% level.
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4.5 | Robustness checks
For robustness and to further corroborate our results, we employ an
alternative indicator of voice and accountability from the World
Bank (2018) to replace the HDI. The indicator of voice and account-
ability measures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citi-
zens have freedom of expression in their beliefs and are also given
rights in electing their government. Based on the models presented in
Table 9, we still find consistent results for Hypothesis 3b. The direct
effect of the indicator of voice and accountability (Voicet  1) is
negatively associated with the cost of equity at 1% level. The
empirical evidence for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3a remains the same. For
example, all models in Table 9 show that there is a non-linear relation-
ship between a firm's environmental disclosure and its ex ante cost of
equity.
5 | CONCLUSION
A recently evolving shared belief around the world—that firms ought
to report their influence on the planet—has persuaded investors to
no longer view disclosing environmental information simply as a
moral issue. More and more investors start perceiving environmental
disclosure as crucial in helping them to make a better informed
assessment of firms' future business scenarios. In this study, we
examine how a company's quantity of environmental disclosure influ-
ences its ex ante cost of equity. Furthermore, we examine whether
country features play a role in shaping this relation. By focusing on
MNCs across many countries, our paper extends the prior literature
which is mostly limited to single-country studies. Our study builds
empirical support by employing a large international dataset con-
sisting of 1481 firms from 43 countries and territories between 2013
and 2019. With an international dataset covering developed and
developing nations, we observe a considerable cross-country varia-
tion. The empirical findings in this study help us to draw suggestions
for public policy, firms' environmental strategy and their financial
practice.
We start by measuring our sample firms' ex ante equity financing
costs using five different valuation approaches all based on equity
analysts' forecasted data. We consider the ex ante cost of equity as
the most appropriate forward-looking estimation method as it reflects
how investors price these firms' riskiness based on the information
they are given. To avoid distortions and measurement problems from
any particular approach, we use averages of those valuation models to
gauge the firms' ex ante cost of equity.
Firstly, we demonstrate that there is a potential non-linear rela-
tion between a firm's environmental disclosure and its ex ante cost of
equity through investors' risk perception. Our empirical evidence
shows that the environmental information a firm discloses to the pub-
lic is value relevant because of a reduction of shareholders' informa-
tion asymmetry. Consequently, firms are able to reduce their ex ante
cost of equity by selecting the optimal disclosure level in their envi-
ronmental issues. However, our empirical results show that a firm can
reduce its ex ante cost of equity by increasing its environmental dis-
closure up to a certain level, but beyond that point the ex ante cost of
equity will start rising. By visualising how our sample countries spread
around this U-shaped curve, we find most of our sample firms are to
the left of this turning point and can benefit from revealing more envi-
ronmental information to the public. For most sample firms, the
environmental disclosure benefits outweigh their environmental dis-
closure costs. A company's environmental quantitative disclosure can
change investors' perception of a firm's riskiness via the mechanism of
reducing market information asymmetry, which in turn reduces the ex
ante cost of equity.
We also examine the joint effects of a firm's GHG intensity and
environmental disclosure on its ex ante cost of equity. We find that a
firm with a higher GHG intensity is not reflexively penalised by inves-
tors with a higher required risk premium. Investors are willing to mod-
erate their required risk premium when companies disclose more
environmental data because their information asymmetry is reduced.
Our findings imply that investors do not count a firm's GHG intensity
alone but rather in association with its disclosed environmental infor-
mation available to the public.
Finally, we contribute to the environmental and CSR literature by
exploring whether non-financial country-level factors play a role in
influencing how investors perceive a firm's riskiness after controlling
for the level of environmental disclosure. Non-financial factors at the
country level have so far received little attention. We provide
supporting evidence on the important role of these two non-financial
factors for a firm's ex ante cost of equity across countries: a country's
environmental performance and its human development progress.
When a multinational firm is domiciled in a country with a better
country environmental performance and greater human development
progress, investors perceive this firm to be less risky and thereby
require a lower ex ante cost of equity. Our empirical results support
that investors price these two non-financial country factors in their
investment process.
In response to the increasing number of international agreements
on climate protection and sustainability, improving a country's envi-
ronmental performance has become a more important aim for
policymakers. For instance, after the Paris Agreement signed in 2015,
the efforts devoted by national governments have focused on reduc-
ing emissions and favouring the transition towards a low-carbon econ-
omy. Our findings make a case for policymakers to strengthen this
goal further. In addition to a better environmental country perfor-
mance being a worthwhile goal in itself, it can also promote their local
equity markets and contribute to a better allocation of investors'
resources. Based on our empirical evidence, firms in countries with
better environmental performance are more likely to secure a lower
cost of equity. Therefore, policymakers can attract MNCs to domicile
in their countries since a better country environmental performance
reduces companies' perceived environmental risk and the required
equity risk premium.
Finally, our paper suggests that most of our sample firms will
enjoy a cheaper cost of equity if they are more transparent with
their environmental data. Our empirical findings echo the policies
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set by the PRI (United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment),
which aim to encourage investors to incorporate a firm's environ-
mental information into their investment decisions. We find that a
firm that discloses a greater amount of environmental information is
perceived as less risky by the investors via the concept of market
information asymmetry, which can result in a lower ex ante cost of
equity. Our paper supports the demand for greater transparency in
environmental issues at the company level, while we also identify
several key factors which can influence investors' risk perception. A
policy implication of our findings is that regulators, policymakers and
companies should collaborate on developing a standardised corpo-
rate sustainability reporting on a global level, thereby providing
investors with a more holistic view for evaluating the riskiness of
their investments. Multinational firms will especially benefit from
global standardised sustainability reporting since they raise capital in
multiple financial markets.
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ENDNOTES
1 In this study, the greenhouse gas intensity is defined as the ratio of a
firm's total greenhouse gas emissions divided by its sales revenue. We
convert this ratio to a common currency, the US dollar, in order to com-
pare all our sample firms around the world.
2 For the indicator of the ex ante Cost of Equity COEA, we take the aver-
age value of the ex ante cost of equity from the following five valuation
models: Model 1 (Claus & Thomas, 2001), Model 2 (Ohlson & Juettner-
Nauroth, 2005), Model 3 (Gebhardt et al., 2001), Model 4 (Easton, 2004)
and Model 5 (forward earnings/price ratio) (Pinto, 2020). For the indica-
tor of the ex ante Cost of Equity COEB, we take the average value of the
ex ante cost of equity from the following four valuation models: Model
1 (Claus & Thomas, 2001), Model 2 (Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth, 2005),
Model 3 (Gebhardt et al., 2001) and Model 4 (Easton, 2004). For the
indicator of the ex ante Cost of Equity COEC, the ex ante cost of equity
derived from (Model 5) forward earnings/price ratio (Pinto, 2020). For
more detailed information on how we estimate our sample firms' ex ante
cost of equity, please refer to Appendix A.
3 To ensure the robustness of our regressions, we also use the alternative
measurement (GHG Scope 1t  1/EBITDAt  1) for the firm's greenhouse
intensity.
4 0.1235*(0.0256) = 0.0031
5 (0.0031)/0.1034 = .0.0305
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APPENDIX A. HOW TO ESTIMATE OUR SAMPLE FIRMS' EX
ANTE COST OF EQUITY
We collect all equity analysts' earnings forecasts and actual share
prices for our sample firms from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S available
in Eikon. A firm's ex-ante equity financing cost, representing as a
firm's ex-ante cost of equity, can be calculated by adopting the follow-
ing principle: the present value of future earnings forecasts on a sam-
ple firm will be equal to its current share price. Therefore, we can
derive the internal rate of return from each valuation model described
below and use it as a firm's ex-ante cost of equity in this study.
Here, we provide an explanation of our estimation process for
the ex-ante cost of equity employing the equations (from Equation 2
to Equation 6) shown in Table 1 available in Section 3.1.1, which rep-
resent the five valuation models we use in this study. For the first four
models (corresponding from Equation 2 to Equation 5), the ex-ante
cost of equity is estimated for each sample firm and each year by solv-
ing for the ex-ante cost of equity Ri (the unknown term in the equa-
tion) that equates the prevailing share price and the valuation model
price. In a more precise way and to take into consideration the relative
different sensitivity of the model in relation to different levels of price,
the cost of equity estimated is assumed to solve the optimisation
problem when the absolute difference between the actual price and
the estimated price with the ex-ante cost of equity is lower than 5%
of the price. We remove the ex-ante cost of equity estimations that
fail to satisfy this rule. Given that the optimisation problem can pro-
vide multiple results, the reiteration stops when a positive ex-ante
cost of equity is found. When the solution is not strictly positive or
when there is no solution to the problem, the observation of that cost
of equity is put as missing. Finally, for all five models, we trim all the
ex-ante cost of equity values, which are negative or greater than 1.
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